This week, Chowdeck and GoLemon shook hands on a deal that both startups say “just makes sense.” And at first glance, it does.
GoLemon, a grocery delivery startup founded in 2024, built its business by selling bulk groceries at lower prices with scheduled delivery. Until recently, customers could receive orders about two days after purchase, a model that prioritised affordable prices and quality over speed. In late 2024, however, it began piloting next-day delivery in select areas.
Chowdeck, on the other hand, was created after its founder struggled to order food online, and that has shaped its approach to logistics. It specialises in ultra-fast delivery of meals and essentials — typically within 20 to 40 minutes — thanks to a growing network of riders and, more recently, dark stores.
Under this partnership, a selection of GoLemon products will be made available on Chowdeck, allowing customers who want faster delivery to simply add groceries to their Chowdeck cart and receive same-day or even under-hour delivery. Bulk purchases, on the other hand, continue with GoLemon.
And that’s where the trouble begins.
A mismatch in values?
In 2024, GoLemon CEO Yinka Adewuyi noted that a grocery delivery startup could choose any two of speed, price, or quality as its primary value proposition to users.
The combination for GoLemon is price and quality. For Chowdeck, the combination is speed and convenience, and that’s reflected in its daily order volumes and revenue model. In fact, for much of the first three years of operation, CEO Femi Aluko insisted that Chowdeck was not necessarily optimising for being a cheap delivery service, with its delivery fees frequently higher than that of competitors.
This clash in values is where GoLemon could soon see itself struggling. By making GoLemon products available within Chowdeck’s ecosystem, it is sending a message to customers. If you want your groceries fast, use Chowdeck; if you don’t mind waiting, use us.
That message, even if unintended, could cannibalise GoLemon’s future relevance.
When old habits die hard
Consumer behaviour is not just about what customers need; it’s also about what they habitually do. And in many cases, frequency often correlates with top-of-mind recall and wallet share. A customer who uses an app several times a week for convenience items becomes less likely to return to a second app that they only open once every few weeks.
It’s a pattern that has played out in the financial services space in Nigeria. Fintechs, once favoured for small ticket purchases, have increasingly become the first choice for many users, replacing traditional banks.
Chowdeck’s model, like other quick commerce players, has scaled on this principle. And in recent months, it has added features such as bills payment and ticket sales, presumably to diversify revenue sources and build stickiness. It is this stickiness that has aided the rapid growth of quick delivery marketplaces elsewhere, even when prices are higher than those of in-store alternatives, proving that consumers will pay a premium for convenience.
GoLemon, by contrast, caters to less frequent, larger basket purchases. However, in the context of rising cost pressures in Nigeria, consumer behaviour may not conform neatly to categories. A small purchase today can easily become a habit, particularly if it’s faster, easier, and more convenient.
And therein lies the problem. Chowdeck is fighting for and appears to be winning in terms of frequency. If customers begin discovering GoLemon’s catalogue first inside the Chowdeck ecosystem, then they may never build a habit around GoLemon’s standalone app.
The danger of being second choice
Perhaps GoLemon’s leadership believes this partnership will help it retain customers who demand speed without having to build or subsidise a same-day delivery infrastructure. That’s not an unreasonable assumption. Building a quick commerce capability is capital intensive and operationally complex.
Yet the absence of disclosed financial terms makes it hard to assess whether GoLemon is truly capturing value in this partnership. Is it selling at wholesale? Taking a margin? Sharing data? That information matters because the specific deal structure will influence how much control GoLemon retains in this partnership.
Without clarity, customers could end up perceiving GoLemon not as a destination grocery app but as a supplier to Chowdeck, an inclusion that enhances Chowdeck’s value proposition far more than it does GoLemon’s.
And even if GoLemon’s bulk-basket customers remain loyal for now, basket sizes and consumer needs are fluid. A “small” purchase today could easily become tomorrow’s default choice for even larger baskets because of ease and habit.
A counterargument could be that this partnership could serve as a top-of-funnel discovery channel for GoLemon. Customers who encounter GoLemon products while using Chowdeck might eventually seek out GoLemon’s own app for bulk orders and lower fees.
In theory, this could broaden GoLemon’s reach without the associated marketing spend. But this assumes that consumers differentiate between brands based on nuanced pricing and delivery trade-offs and that they are willing to switch apps for a marginally lower price on bulk purchases.
Moreover, a user’s first exposure to GoLemon via Chowdeck could lead them to associate the GoLemon brand with the competitor’s interface and ecosystem, not GoLemon’s own app.
An alternative proposition
But that does not mean both parties cannot work together. Only that a more favourable partnership might see GoLemon use quick commerce providers as strictly last-mile infrastructure providers.
In this model, the entire customer journey, from discovery to checkout and payment, remains within GoLemon’s app, with delivery speed becoming a choice at checkout. Scheduled deliveries continue at the default price, while instant delivery is fulfilled by a third party at a premium.
Owning checkout also means owning behavioural levers. GoLemon would control basket nudges, substitutions, promotions, loyalty mechanics, and timing prompts, decisions that shape purchasing behaviour over time. Listing products directly inside Chowdeck hands that advantage to Chowdeck.
The risks of this approach, including margin pressure and service dependency, are real but manageable through the use of multiple delivery partners and sensible defaults. But crucially, it keeps GoLemon’s ceiling higher, as owning checkout means owning customers, data, and behaviour.
